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Miscegenation Statutes and the Supreme Court:
A Brief Prediction of What the Court Will Do and Why
DAVID E. SEIDELSON*
IN McLaughlin v. Florida' the United States Supreme Court held uncon-
stitutional a statute providing that:
Any Negro man and white woman, or any white man and Negro woman,
who are not married to each other, who shall habitually live in and occupy in
the nighttime the same room shall each be punished by imprisonment not
exceeding 12 months, or by fine not exceeding $500.2
In reaching its detennination that this criminal statute violated the equal
protection clause of the fourteenth amendment, the Court was able to "posit
the constitutionality of the [Florida] ban against the marriage of a Negro
and white";3 hence, the Court was not compelled to determine whether or
not Florida's miscegenation statute was unconstitutional. However, there are
indications that such avoidance will not be practical very much longer.
By letter dated January 6, 1965, the Assistant Comptroller General of the
United States refused to authorize "payment of arrears of pay and allowances
... and death gratuity" 4 to the alleged Negro widow of a deceased white sol-
dier whose purported marriage occurred in Texas where miscegenous mar-
riages are prohibited. In so doing, the Assistant Comptroller General wrote:
While constitutionality of Florida's laws barring interracial marriage was
questioned in the recent case, McLaughlin et. al. v. State of Florida, decided
by the Supreme Court on December 7, 1964, the Court decided that case on
the basis of the criminal statute involved and declined to express any views
about the state's prohibition of interracial marriage.
Associate Professor of Law, The George Washington University.
'379 U.S. 184 (1964).
2 Ibid.
8 Id. at 195.
' Letter From Frank H. Weitzel, Assistant Comptroller General of the United States, to
Lt. Col. P. M. Callinan, Finance and Accounting Officer, Jan. 6, 1965, Dept. of the Army file
No. B-155582, p. 1.
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In view of this and other recent judicial rulings in the field of race rela-
tions, we feel that we should make no determination as to the validity of Pri-
vate Waters' marriage at the present time ...
... Accordingly, the matter is too doubtful to warrant payment of the gratuity
to Ida Nell Waters as surviving spouse and, since the question of validity of
Private Waters' marriage cannot be resolved on the basis of the current judi-
cial decisions, no payment of death gratuity at this time is authorized. 5
Clearly, this kind of doubt cannot be left unresolved indefinitely; its resolu-
tion apparently will require judicial decision.
In June, 1965, the Supreme Court of Virginia granted a writ of error and
supersedeas6 which resulted in that court's affirmation of the conviction in
1958 of a white man and a Negro woman under Virginia's miscegenation
statute.7 Pending now is an Oklahoma case involving the refusal to issue a
marriage license to one Francine Aline Jones, "of African descent," and Jesse
Marquez, "not of African descent."8 Moreover, whatever tactical reasons may
5Id. at 2-3.
Loving v. Virginia, No. 6163, Va., March 7, 1966. The lower court suspended a one-year
sentence for violation of the miscegenation statute, on the condition that the parties leave the
state. On appeal petitioner made a direct constitutional challenge of the statute. The Virginia
Supreme Court, affirming the conviction, refused to accept the suspended sentence and re-
manded for resentencing. Addressing itself to the constitutional challenge the court cited
precedents sustaining the constitutionality of miscegenation statutes, said that such "socio-
logical" arguments were more properly directed to the state legislature, and stated that
striking down the statute would be a gross example of "judicial legislation."
7 Intermarriage prohibited; meaning of term "white persons." - It shall hereafter be
unlawful for any white person in this State to marry any save a white person, or a person with
no other admixture of blood than white and American Indian. For the purpose of this chap-
ter, the term "white person" shall apply only to such person as has no trace whatever of
any blood other than Caucasian; but persons who have one-sixteenth or less of the blood of
the American Indian and have no other non-Caucasic blood shall be deemed to be white
persons. All laws heretofore passed and now in effect shall apply to marriages prohibited by
this chapter. VA. STAT. §20-54 (1924).
Punishment for marriage. - If any white person intermarry with a colored person, or
any colored person intermarry with a white person, he shall be guilty of a felony and
shall be punished by confinement in the penitentiary for not less than one nor more
than five years.
VA. STAT. §20-59 (1932).
Colored persons and Indians defined. - Every person in whom there is ascertainable
any Negro blood shall be deemed and taken to be a colored person, and every person
not a colored person having one-fourth or more of American Indian blood shall be
deemed an American Indian; except that members of Indian tribes existing in this Com-
monwealth having one-fourth or more of Indian blood and less than one-sixteenth of
Negro blood shall be deemed tribal Indians.
VA. STAT. §1-14 (1954).
8 Jones and Marquez v. Shaw, appeal docketed, Civil No. 41393, Okla.,
1965. The Oklahoma constitution, Art. 23, §11, provides:
Colored race-Negro race-White race.-Whenever in this Constitution and laws of
this State, the word or words, "colored" or "colored race," "negro" or "negro race," are
used, the same shall be construed to mean or apply to all persons of African descent.
The term "white race" shall include all other persons."
OKLA. STAT. tit. 43 §12 (1910) provides:
Miscegenation prohibited.-The marriage of any person of African descent, as defined
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have deterred Negro organizations and other groups interested in assuring
full civil rights for colored people from attempting to secure a definitive
Court ruling in the past have been diminished substantially, if, indeed, they
subsist at all. Reportedly, the NAACP is now prepared to support legal at-
tacks on miscegenation statutes, and the American Civil Liberties Union
filed an amicus curiae brief with the Oklahoma Supreme Court in the Jones
case.9 In short, the time seems near when the Court will be compelled to de-
termine if statutes prohibiting interracial marriage are constitutional. In
this article I shall attempt to predict how the Court will decide and why. I
do so with an awareness of the presumptousness of my undertaking such a
chore, but with the hope that the effort may prove helpful, interesting, or at
least palatable to others.
Perhaps an appropriate point of beginning is Perez v. Lippold1O the only
case decided to date which has held a miscegenation statute unconstitutional.
In reaching that conclusion, Justice Traynor utilized or at least paid his re-
spects to several constitutional tenets: free exercise of religion, due process,
vagueness and uncertainty, and equal protection. Justice Carter in his con-
curring opinion invoked seriatim: the Declaration of Independence, the
Gettysburg Address, the California Constitution, the fifth amendment (due
process), the entire fourteenth amendment, the Charter of the United Na-
tions, and the Apostle Paul. In addition, Justice Carter quoted that portion
of Mein Kampt which advocates preservation of the pure blood, with the
obvious connotation that anything Adolf Hitler advocated must be bad"-
perhaps not an unsound proposition at that. But even to one with some
awareness of the difficulties inherent in attempting to categorize or isolate
constitutional issues, the methodology of the court in Perez does seem like
killing a fly with a load of buckshot. Even assuming the potential virulence
of the insect, the ammunition is somewhat hit-or-miss. If possible, it might
be revealing to attempt some isolation of the factors that do or do not make
a miscegenation statute unconstitutional.
This function may be begun by examining some of the grounds relied on
by Justice Traynor. The first of these, freedom of religion, seems to have been
imposed upon him by the petitioners, "members of the Roman Catholic
by the Constitution of this State, to any person not of African descent, or the marriage
of any person not of African descent to any person of African descent, shall be unlawful
and is hereby prohibited within this State.
OKLA. STAT. tit. 43 §13 (1910) provides:
Penalty for miscegenation.-Any person who shall marry in violation of the preceding
section, shall be deemed guilty of a felony, and upon conviction thereof shall be fined
in any sum not exceeding five hundred dollars, and imprisoned in the penitentiary not
less than one nor more than five years.
'See ACLU news release No. 116, Mar. 22, 1965.
"32 Cal. 2d 711, 198 P. 2d 17 (1948).
DId. at 739, 198 P. 2d at 33-34.
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Church ... [who] maintain[ed] that since the church has no rule forbidding
marriages between Negroes and Caucasians, they [were] entitled to receive
the sacrament of matrimony."' 12 That assertion of the petitioners-what re-
ligion permits, secular law cannot prohibit-can hardly avoid calling to mind
Reynolds v. United States.13 There the accused, convicted of bigamy, asserted
to the Supreme Court that he was a member of a religious sect (The Church
of Jesus Christ of Latter-Day Saints, commonly called the "Mormon
Church") 14 which not only permitted but even imposed upon its male mem-
bers, "circumstances permitting,"'15 the duty of polygamy. The Court affirmed
the judgment of conviction. While its attempted distinction between religious
beliefs and religious acts invited-and received' 6 -criticism, the Court's deci-
sion in Reynolds does indicate that in the United States when religious tenet
and secular law conflict, secularism usually predominates. That indication
alone casts considerable doubt on the validity of petitioners' assertion in
Perez. The result in Reynolds suggests that the assertion of petitioners in
Perez constituted a non sequitur: to say that a church does not prohibit cer-
tain conduct, therefore secular law cannot, assumes the point at issue, i.e.,
that the law violates constitutionally protected religious freedom, the very
assumption negated by Reynolds. As Justice Traynor noted, "If the miscege-
nation law under attack ... is directed at a social evil and employs a reason-
able means to prevent that evil, it is valid regardless of its incidental effect
upon the conduct of particular religious groups."' 7
It may be worthwhile to contemplate the potential effects which would
have flowed from a judicial decision that the California statute was uncon-
stitutional on the freedom of religion ground asserted by the petitioners.
Since their assertion was based upon membership in the Catholic Church,
where marriage is a sacrament, presumably their position was that the stat-
ute was unconstitutional as applied to them. Suppose the court had so held.
Suppose, too, that after such a holding, two atheists, one white and one Ne-
gro, sought a marriage license in California and were refused because of the
miscegenation statute. If the applicants petitioned the court and if the court
stood by its holding and reasoning in the prior case, presumably it would not
find the statute unconstitutional as to the two atheists since they were not
denied "the sacrament of marriage." Such a decision, following the prior
holding, would raise a neat constitutional question in itself. If a court by its
' Supra note 10, at 713, 198 P. 2d at 18.
98 U.S. 145 (1878).
1 Id. at 161.
is Ibid.
18 KURLAND, RELIGION AND THE LAw 22 (1962). Demonstrative of the perils of publication,
whether judicial decision or legal study, is a critical review of Professor Kurland's book.
Freedman, Book Review, 9 How. L. J. 92 (1963). Professor Freedman's review begins: "This
is a disappointing book."
1 Supra note 10, at 713, 198 P. 2d at 18.
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decisions interpreting a statute permits the interracial marriage of two Cath-
olics (or members of any religious sect recognizing the sacrament of mar-
riage) and prohibits the interracial marriage of atheists, hasn't that court
violated the establishment clause of the Constitution? 8 Has not it provided
an advantage, and therefore an inducement, to members of organized re-
ligious sects which is not available to nonmembers? Of course, the clause
designates as the acting body upon which the restriction operates the United
States Congress. Judicial opinions have made it clear that the restriction ap-
plies equally to state legislative bodies;' 9 but does it apply to decisions of state
courts? By combining the facts that (1) court action may comprise state ac-
tion20 and (2) in our hypothetical situation the court action consisted of de-
termining the validity and applicability of legislation, it seems not too far-
fetched to conclude that such judicial action might be found to violate the
establishment clause. And the atheists denied the right to marry probably
would have standing to raise the constitutional question. All in all, petition-
ers' contention that the California miscegenation statute be deemed violative
of the free exercise clause seems to be something less than a perfect ground
for decision.
Another ground suggested by Justice Traynor in support of his conclusion
that the statute in Perez was unconstitutional rested on his determination
that it was "too vague and uncertain to constitute a valid regulation." 21 While
vagueness and uncertainty are potential deficiencies usually associated with
criminal statutes, Justice Traynor asserted the oppositeness of these deficien-
cies "to laws governing fundamental rights and liberties." 22 Since he found
marriage to be "a fundamental right of free men," 23 Justice Traynor con-
cluded that the California statutory scheme was "too vague and uncertain to
be upheld as a valid regulation of the right to marry."24 The language of the
California statutes was as follows:
All marriages of white persons with Negroes, Mongolians, members of the
Malay race, or mulattoes are illegal and void.25
[No] license may be issued authorizing the marriage of a white person with a
Negro, mulatto, Mongolian, or member of the Malay race.26
To determine whether or not words are so vague and uncertain as to pre-
" "Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment of religion,.." U. S. CONST.
amend. I.
"See, e.g., Cantwell v. Connecticut, 310 U.S. 296 (1940).
oShelley v. Kraemer, 334 U.S. 1 (1948).
Supra note 10, at 728, 198 P. 2d at 27.
=Ibid.
Supra note 10, at 714, 198 P. 2d at 19.
"Supra note 10, at 731, 198 P. 2d at 29.
Cal. Stat., 1933, c.104, p.561, repealed by Cal. Stat., 1959, c.146, p.2043, §1.
21 Cal. Stat., 1905, c.186, p.182, §1; the quoted portion was omitted by Cal. Stat., 1959, c.146,
p.2043, §2.
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clude intelligent comprehension, and, therefore, knowledgeable action, it
may be appropriate to turn to a good dictionary. Webster's unabridged dic-
tionary offers this definition of Negro: "A person belonging to the black race.
... Law-a person of African descent. In the absence of statutory definition
it has been held not to include a mulatto... , but statutes define it differently,
some even including one having any measurable trace of Negro blood."
27
While either of these definitions may seem inadequate or even incorrect to
anthropologists, it is a "canon of statutory interpretation" (admittedly a
phrase somewhat less potent than the weapon it conjures up) that where a
word or phrase is subject to a technical definition different from its ordinary
meaning, the ordinary meaning should prevail.2 8 Webster's unabridged also
offers definitions of Mongolians, 29 members of the Malay race,30 and mulat-
toes; 31 while these, too, may be less than adequate to anthropologists, the
canon would indicate that the ordinary meanings are sufficient, even deter-
minative.
Since it seems probable that the miscegenation case most likely to reach
the Supreme Court will involve a white-Negro marriage, let us direct atten-
tion to the term "Negro." The California statute prohibits a white person
from marrying a Negro or a Mulatto. If Mulatto is taken to mean "the first
generation offspring of a pure Negro and a white"3 2 it would appear to be a
reasonable conclusion that the statute prohibits a white person from marry-
ing anyone who is one-half or more Negro. That seems plain enough, bearing
in mind that it may ignore the "popular use" of the word mulatto, conceiv-
ably contrary to the canon of construction above noted.
In some other states, the word "Negro" as used in miscegenation statutes is
defined within the statute.33 In those cases it may be even more difficult to
hold the word unconstitutionally vague and uncertain, putting aside the
difficulties of proof of the necessary amount of "Negro blood." In short,
vagueness and uncertainty may leave something to be desired as the founda-
tion supporting a decision that a miscegenation statute is unconstitutional.
How about due process? Does that offer an appropriate basis for holding
a miscegenation statute unconstitutional? Justice Traynor wrote: "The due
process clause ... protects an area of personal liberty not yet wholly delim-
WWEBSTER's NEW INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY 1638 (2d ed. 1939). A portion of the entire
definition is quoted.
2 Nix v. Hedden, 149 U.S. 304 (1893); Bubar v. Dizdar, 240 Minn. 26, 60 N.W. 2d 77 (1953).
" Supra note 27, at 1583.
30 Supra note 27, at 1488.
" Supra note 27, at 1608.
8 Ibid. It should be noted, however, that the definition includes the following: "... in pop-
ular use, any person of mixed Caucasion and Negro blood."
1 "In five states, the prohibition includes persons with 1/6 or more Negro blood, in six,
with 1/8 or more, in one, with 1/14 or more, and in one, with 1/16 or more." HARPER & SKOL-
NICK, PROBLEMS OF THE FAMILY 100 (rev. ed. 1962).
1966]
Catholic University Law Review
ited."34 (Just nine years after the adoption of the fourteenth amendment, the
Supreme Court prophetically stated that "difficulty may be experienced in
giving to those terms [the due process clause] a definition which will embrace
every permissible exertion of power affecting private rights, and exclude
such as is forbidden .. " Obviously the difficulty persists; it probably is in-
herent in the nature of the clause. 35 That sentence of Justice Traynor's is fol-
lowed by a two-sentence quotation from the United States Supreme Court's
opinion in Meyer v. Nebraska,36 an affirmation that marriage "is a funda-
mental right of free men,"37 and finally: "there can be no prohibition of mar-
riage except for an important social objective and by reasonable means."38
And that ends that paragraph of Justice Traynor's opinion; the next para-
graph begins: "No law within the broad areas of state interest may be un-
reasonably discriminatory or arbitrary." 39 That kind of language sounds more
like the kind usually employed in a discussion of equal protection, rather
than due process. Of course, candor compels recognition of the (legal) fact
that the two clauses are intimately connected and, frequently, separable only
by the most painful and sometimes artificial kind of excision. After all, both
clauses are part of section 1 of the fourteenth amendment. In fact, except
for convenience and ease of verbal or written expression, it may even be in-
appropriate to refer to them as separate clauses. "Although the equal pro-
tection clause is the vehicle the Court utilizes when state governments im-
pose invidious racial discriminations, it is evident that the concept of equal-
ity enunciated in that clause is increasingly considered to be part of the
larger, all-embracing concept of due process." 4° However, remembering our
purpose to be as specific as possible in defining constitutional tests for mis-
cegenation statutes, the "all-embracing concept of due process" probably is
not the most definitive test by which to determine the validity of miscegena-
tion statutes.
81Supra note 10, at 714, 198 P. 2d at 18.
1 Pennoyer v. Neff, 95 U.S. 714, 733 (1877).
f262 U.S. 390 (1923). In Meyer, the court held that a statute prohibiting the teaching in
school of any modern language other than English to children below the tenth grade was
violative of the fourteenth amendment. In discussing the scope of due process protection, the
Court noted:
While this court has not attempted to define with exactness the liberty thus guaran-
teed, the term has received much consideration and some of the included things have
been definitely stated. Without doubt, it denotes not merely freedom from bodily re-
straint but also the right of the individual to contract, to engage in any of the common
occupations of life, to acquire useful knowledge, to marry, establish a home and bring up
children, to worship God according to the dictates of his own conscience, and generally
to enjoy those privileges long recognized at common law as essential to the orderly pur-
suit of happiness by free men. Id. at 399. (Emphasis added.)
17Supra note 10, at 714, 198 P. 2d at 19.
as Ibid.
Ibid.
0 Miller, An Affirmative Thrust to Due Process of Law? 30 GEo. WASH. L. REv. 399, 413
(1962).
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That leaves equal protection-the most likely critical battleground for the
ultimate determination. Of course, the mere designation of a class less than
the whole to be subjected to special or restrictive state action does not vio-
late the equal protection clause. Violation occurs only when the description
or designation is unreasonable or the action inappropriate in light of the
purpose to be accomplished by the statute. However, where the statute in-
volved embodies a racial classification, there must be demonstrated an "over-
riding statutory purpose requiring the proscription of the specified conduct
when engaged in by a white person and a Negro, but not otherwise." 41 What
are some of the purposes likely to be profferred by those advocating the va-
lidity of miscegenation statutes?
It is conceivable (but, hopefully, unlikely) that one ground may be an
alleged mental inferiority of colored people. Certainly, a state has a right to
prohibit or impose restrictions upon the right of mentally defective persons
to marry. But is a prohibition of interracial marriage a reasonable means of
accomplishing that end? The answer seems to be patently negative. The ap-
propriate way to avoid the supposed evil consequences of a mentally defec-
tive person entering into marriage is to prohibit marriage to those individ-
uals falling below the acceptable mental level.42 Conceivably (but again,
hopefully, unlikely), another ground which may be asserted in support of
miscegenation statutes is an alleged higher incidence among Negroes of cer-
tain loathsome, contagious diseases which may be passed on to spouse or off-
spring. Again, a state has a right to prohibit or impose restrictions upon the
right of persons with such diseases to marry. But is the prohibition of inter-
racial marriage a reasonable means of accomplishing that end? Again, the
answer seems to be patently negative. The appropriate way to avoid the sup-
posed evils of such persons entering into marriage is to prohibit marriage to
those having such diseases.43 In each of these instances, the description or
41 McLaughlin v. Florida, supra note 1, at 192.
42 For example, N. Y. DOM RELS. LAW §7 provides:
A marriage is void from the time its nullity is declared by a court of competent juris-
diction if either party thereto: ... Is incapable of consenting to a marriage for want of
understanding....
PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 48, §§ 1-5 (1953) provides:
No license to marry shall be issued by any clerk .... if either of the applicants for a li-
cense is weak minded, insane, of unsound mind, or is under guardianship as a person of
unsound mind.
41 Wis. STAT. ANN. § 245.06 (1917) provides:
All persons making application for license to marry shall submit to an examination for
the presence of any venereal disease.... [A] certificate of negative finding as to each of
the parties ... shall be filed with the county clerk at the time application for a license
to marry is made....
Only three states, North Carolina, North Dakota, and Washington, prohibit the mar-
riage of persons having tuberculosis "in the infectious stages" (North Carolina), or "in
its advanced stages" (North Dakota and Washington).... Delaware prohibits the mar-
riage of a party who has any "communicable disease the nature of which is unknown to
the other party;" Indiana prohibits the marriage of any person who is "afflicted with a
1966]
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designation of the class in terms of race is patently too broad for, or more
likely, totally unrelated to the alleged purpose to be accomplished. In other
words, the designation of the class is unreasonable, hence violative of equal
protection. Regardless of any statistics which might be offered to "prove" an
alleged mental inferiority or abnormal incidence of certain diseases on the
part of Negroes, the vast number of Negroes with average or higher than
average mental ability and without such diseases, coupled with the relative
ease of prohibiting marriage specifically to those persons afflicted with men-
tal weakness or designated diseases, makes it clearly unreasonable to bottom
miscegenation statutes on a legislative purpose to preclude mental defectives
or diseased individuals from marrying. The Court probably will not, and un-
doubtedly should not, waste much time or energy in disposing of both of
these grounds.
Those urging the validity of miscegenation statutes may assert that the
statutes are intended to protect the parties to such a marriage from economic
sanctions likely to be imposed by the community, or some part of the com-
munity. That such economic penalties may be inflicted upon those entering
a racially mixed marriage seems to be recognized even by the parties to the
marriage. "[T]hey are fearful of losing their jobs and usually conceal the fact
of the marriage to one of another race." 44 It may be argued that there is a
legitimate state interest in prohibiting such marriages for the purpose of
eliminating such economic sanctions and thereby reducing the number of po-
tential indigents the state may be required to support or to assist financially.
There would seem to be at least a couple of appropriate responses to such
an argument. First, it would be somewhat unusual if the state had the power
to protect presumably competent individuals from their own actions. If two
people of different races, otherwise competent to intermarry, decide to do so
regardless of potential economic sanctions, it should require an overwhelm-
ing state interest to justify prohibition of the marriage on economic grounds.
After all, competent adults generally are considered capable of deciding
whether or not to act-even where the act might waive some constitutional
right. For example, an accused in a criminal proceeding may waive his fifth
amendment protection and testify; presumably one may submit to an illegal
search and seizure and, by not objecting, permit the fruit of such a search to
be admitted in evidence against him; and an accused may waive his right to
a speedy trial-perhaps by mere failure to demand it. Similarly, it would seem
that two competent adults should be deemed capable of intermarrying with
knowledge that the marriage may affect adversely their economic positions.
transmissible disease;" and in Pennsylvania there is, indirectly, such a prohibition in the
form of a requirement that upon application for a license the parties must declare that
they do not have any transmissible disease.
See I VERNIER, AMERICAN FAMILY LAWS 199 (1931).
11 HARPER & SKOLNICK, supra note 33, at 103.
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Of course, one might assert that when the adverse economic effects result
in an additional tax burden for the state, the state has a right to act. Perhaps.
But what kind of action may it take? Here lies the second response to the argu-
ment. Since the portended economic restrictions would be imposed by others
than the parties to the marriage (and remembering that marriage is a "fun-
damental right"), perhaps appropriate state action would be a statutory pro-
hibition of imposing economic sanctions based on the race of a spouse, rather
than prohibition of the marriage. Even recognizing that a "remedy" or "pre-
ventive" need not be the best possible in order to pass an equal protection
test, weighing a statutory prohibition of marriage against a statutory prohi-
bition of economic penalties imposed because of the marriage strikes such an
uneven balance that the former method ("device" almost crept in) of pre-
venting an additional state tax burden would seem to be so unreasonable as
to violate the equal protection clause. The potential indigency of the parties
to racially mixed marriages seems inadequate justification for miscegenation
statutes.
What, then, of the adverse social effects likely to be visited upon the par-
ties to such a marriage? Do these provide an appropriate basis for prohibit-
ing the marriage? It may be fair to assume that a racially mixed marriage will
engender a certain degree of adverse social reaction. "The white person usu-
ally cuts all connections with former friends and the Negro also runs into
criticism from members of his own race, as well as intensified hostility from
white people." 45 Should this ostracism, criticism, and hostility be deemed
ample justification for prohibiting such marriages in order to "protect" the
parties? Just as competent adults should be deemed capable of deciding
whether or not to act in the face of potential economic burdens, so
too should they be permitted to act in the face of adverse social reaction. In-
deed, if adverse social reaction is to be considered a sufficient basis for restric-
tive legislation, bow ties and mustaches may be on the way out-legally as
well as sartorially. After all, many people dislike either or both. Some people
"don't trust a man with a mustache," and some feel bow ties are an affectation.
Imagine the hostile reaction a mustachioed man with a bow tie could en-
gender.46 To the rather obvious absurdity of legislation prohibiting lip and
neck wear-and its probable invalidity-should be added another thought:
the right to marry may be a bit more fundamental and important than the
right to wear a mustache or a bow tie.
Suppose, however, the social hostility aroused by a racially mixed mar-
riage is sufficiently great to threaten peace and good order. Is there not, then,
sufficient justification for state action? By all means. However, appropriate
'5 Ibid.
4
6 As a demonstration of objectivity, the author wishes to note that he wears neither mus-
tache nor bow ties.
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state action should consist of enforcement of existing laws aimed at main-
taining tranquility and, if necessary, additional laws imposing sanctions upon
those who would threaten or actually commit harmful or disorderly acts as a
result of a racially mixed marriage. Statutory prohibition of such marriages
as a mode of preserving tranquility makes no more sense than (and, bearing
in mind the "fundamental right" of marriage, even less sense than) statutory
prohibition of bow ties and mustaches.
In short, as to the parties to a racially mixed marriage, social hos-
tility would appear to be inadequate justification for state action, unless and
until the hostility threatened good order. Appropriate state action should be
aimed at those threatening good order; prohibition of racially mixed mar-
riages seems an inappropriate and unreasonable manner of avoiding disor-
derly conduct.
We have noted that economic burdens and social reactions growing out
of racially mixed marriages conceivably could become sufficiently serious to
justify state action aimed at those who would impose the burdens or threaten
the peace. Adverse economic and social reactions of less magnitude would
seem not to justify state action; rather they are potentials to be considered
by the parties contemplating such a marriage, and, if the parties are willing
to risk or endure them, as competent persons they need no state "protection"
in the form of miscegenation statutes.
But what of the children of racially mixed marriages? Here lies what prob-
ably will be the strongest area of argument for those asserting the validity of
miscegenation statutes. First we must put aside such nonsense as this
It is ... a well authenticated fact that if the issue of a black man and a white
woman, and a white man and a black woman, intermarry, they cannot
possibly have any progeny, and such a fact sufficiently justifies those which
forbid the intermarriage of blacks and whites. .. .47
as being unworthy of comment, except to note that scientifically there seems
to be no fear that children of racially mixed marriages will be unable to pro-
create-although one can hardly help but wonder why that thought should
have caused concern to the author of the language quoted above.
More to the point, and much more likely to be argued by those supporting
miscegenation statutes, is the likelihood that children of such marriages will
suffer economically and socially. Unlike the parties to the marriage, poten-
tial offspring are not competent to consider these facts before acting; they
may be objects of economic and social adversity without the opportunity of
deciding whether or not to risk or endure such adversity. There seems to be
some respectable authority for the proposition that such children may face
adversity:
'7 State v. Jackson, 80 Mo. 175, 179 (1883).
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The children of a mixed marriage have a difficult adjustment to make. In
the first place, they are categorized by the white community as Negroes and are
therefore subjected to general discriminatory treatment. Furthermore, certain
myths have arisen concerning mulattoes which add complexity to their relation-
ship to the white world. And in addition, the child may find that he is unwel,
come among his own white relatives.
The status of individuals of mixed blood in the Negro community is more
difficult to generalize and is somewhat paradoxical, containing elements of
stigma and higher social status. The Negro community attaches some slight
stigma to first generation offspring of interracial marriages, but the feeling
is not strong, and the child may even become slightly boastful of his mixed
parentage, feeling that he can at least say that his white blood was legally ac-
quired. Furthermore, because of the large number of Negroes with white blood,
the stigma can only last one generation at the most. On the positive side is
the fact that Negroes place lighter individuals in a higher social strata and fre-
quently give them a preferred position in the Negro community.
The child of a mixed marriage shares certain psychological problems with
all persons of mixed blood, resulting from the fact that personality is to a sig-
nificant extent the function of a group status and of the individual's status
within the group:
"The mixed blood is an unadjusted person. His immediate group has no
respected place in society. In ideals and aspirations he is identified with
the culturally dominant group; in social role and cultural participation
he is identified with the excluded group. He is, in consequence, a man
of divided loyalties. * * * The mixed blood's hysterical and insistent
knocking at the white man's door is a familiar sound in every biracial
situation."
He tends sentimentally to idealize the culturally dominant group and
seek recognition from and admission to it. Yet he is branded socially by his
Negroid physical characteristics. This conflict between the mulatto's wishes
and the requirements of the social order may lead to compensatory personal-
ity characteristics-for example, over-compensation, formalism, bohemianism,
egocentrism, or introversion. He can best find a wholesome personality by
identifying himself wholly with the Negro group, or by passing, if he is able.48
Conceding that potential offspring of a racially mixed marriage (unlike
their parents) lack that moment in time which to make a knowledgeable deci-
sion on the risks involved, consider the validity of miscegenation statutes as
means to "protect" such potential offspring. Insofar as economic adversity is
concerned-or more specifically, the inability to secure appropriate employ-
ment-it would seem that proper state action should be aimed at those who
would discriminate against offspring of racially mixed marriages. Legislation
to accomplish that purpose seems as practical and wise as existing legislation
48Supra note 33, at 104-05. Internal footnotes have been omitted from the quotation.
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aimed at barring racially discriminatory employment practices in general. It
certainly would appear more reasonable than solution of the problem by
eliminating such children-the effect of miscegenation statutes. The latter
solution is about as "reasonable" as prohibiting child labor by eliminating
children.
Similarly, social adversity, to the extent it may be connected with sub-
standard housing, could be eliminated by enforcement, or enactment and
enforcement, of fair housing legislation.
But what of the more subtle, sophisticated, yet probably more invidious
psychic effects on the offspring of racially mixed marriages? Assuming such
offspring may be "unadjusted" to the extent that undesirable "personality
characteristics-for example, overcompensation, formalism, bohemianism,
egocentrism, or introversion" may result, are miscegenation statutes a justi-
fiable preventive device? To determine their justification, i.e., reasonableness
in an equal protection sense, several factors ought to be considered.
First, the protection of such offspring from these social adversities must be
premised on a legislative prediction that the factors which may have caused
these evils in the past will continue to exist in the future. In a sense,
of course, all legislation is bottomed on a prediction of future conditions.
Usually, past experience and existing facts form a reasonably sound basis for
such predictions. It may be so with problems confronting the offspring of
racially mixed marriages. On the other hand, it may be that comparatively
recent advances in assuring rights for colored people have made past experi-
ence obsolete and existing facts obsolescent, at least as workable guides for
predicting the future in the area of race relations. Assuming this to be so-
for the moment, at least-protection of potential offspring of racially mixed
marriages from future social adversities may lack a reasonable factual basis,
or rest upon a crumbling foundation now too weak to support a prohibition
of marriage.
Another line of inquiry which may prove helpful is one directed at a statu-
tory remedy or preventive aimed at those who would inflict such social ad-
versity. it was suggested earlier that legislation aimed at those who would
inflict economic burdens on the parties to a racially mixed marriage or their
offspring would be preferable to legislation prohibiting such marriages; in
fact, it was suggested that it would be so clearly preferable that the latter
legislation would be unreasonable. Could legislation aimed at those respon-
sible for the social adversities confronted by offspring of racially mixed mar-
riages be enacted? The question is asked from a constitutional rather than a
political point of view. If the conduct or conditions responsible for these ad-
versities is subject to legislative remedy or elimination, such legislation is so
far preferable to statutes prohibiting marriage (a "fundamental right"), as
to make miscegenation statutes unreasonable. There is at least an inkling in
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the Supreme Court cases49 upholding the validity of Title II of the Civil
Rights Act of 196450 that such conduct is an appropriate area for legislative
action. While the Court emphasized the power of Congress over commerce,
presumably the state legislatures have somewhat similar power over wholly
intrastate conduct or conditions; a power usually referred to as "the police
power," whatever that amorphous phrase may encompass. Justice Goldberg's
concurring opinion comes very close to a flat statement that social discrimi-
nation justifies legislative action:
The primary purpose of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, however, as the Court
recognizes, and as I would underscore, is the vindication of human dignity
and not mere economics. The Senate Commerce Committee made this quite
clear:
"The primary purpose of * * * [the Civil Rights Act], then, is to solve
this problem, the deprivation of personal dignity that surely accom-
panies denials of equal access to public establishments. Discrimination
is not simply dollars and cents, hamburgers and movies; it is humilia-
tion, frustration, and embarrassment that a person must surely feel
when he is told that he is unacceptable as a member of the public because
of his race or color. It is equally the inability to explain to a child that re-
gardless of education, civility, courtesy, and morality he will be denied
the right to enjoy equal treatment, even though he be a citizen of the
United States and may well be called upon to lay down his life to assure
this Nation continues. '5 1
This language intimates rather clearly that social or psychological adver-
sity may indeed serve as an appropriate basis for legislative action. Does all
this suggest that the psychological harm which may be inflicted upon chil-
dren of mixed marriages justifies state legislative action in the form of mis-
cegenation statutes? Only by a clear perversion of reasoning. If these psychic
evils comprise an appropriate basis for legislative action, that action should
be directed at those who would inflict them, rather than at the innocent ob-
jects of the evils. Just as legislation imposing sanctions upon those who would
discriminate economically against children of mixed marriages is so clearly a
more reasonable legislative activity than legislation ultimately preventing
the conception of the children, so, too, is legislation imposing sanctions upon
those who would inflict psychic harm on such children clearly more reason-
able than legislation preventing their conception. Consequently, legislation
eliminating such children as a means of eliminating the psychic harm should
be deemed violative of the equal protection clause.
What if the conduct and conditions responsible for these social adversities
-Heart of Atlanta Motel, Inc. v. U.S., 379 U.S. 241 (1964); Katzenbach v. McClung, 379
U.S. 294 (1964).
50 78 Stat 241, 243, §§201-07 (1964).
51 Heart of Atlanta Motel, Inc. v. U.S., supra note 49, at 291-92.
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and psychic injuries are not legitimate objects of legislative action? Suppose
they are too personal and too subtle to be regulated practicably or constitu-
itionally by statute. What, if anything, should be done about them? To an-
swer this question, it would be helpful to examine some of the causes and
effects of the conduct and conditions. They affect a potential class of persons
(offspring of racially mixed marriages) each of whom may be subjected to
subtle, personal pressures which may lead to psychological disorders, and
they will be caused by a class of persons which, because of group pressures
operating upon its members, will impose social adversity upon the children
of racially mixed marriages. In what ways may the two groups be dis-
tinguished? The children are the objects of the adversity; the other group is
the originator of that adversity. The psychic disorder which may be suffered
by the offspring is potential only; it may occur or it may not. If it does, it un-
doubtedly will affect only a portion of the class, and how substantial that
portion is rests primarily on conjecture. As to the group which would im-
pose the evil, the psychic pressure is present. Imposition of social or psy-
chological adversity upon racially mixed offspring is a manifestation of its
existence, and, while this latter group may comprise only a portion of the
state's total population, each of its members by his conduct manifests the dis-
order. If one of these groups is to be eliminated, which should it be?
Of course, neither should be. Rather, those who would impose psychic in-
juries upon such offspring should be educated to realize the personal reasons
for the hostility. There should be demonstrated to them the lack of factual
or reasonable bases for their hostility. Their fears should be mitigated by
facts. And if they are not wholly reconciled by such education, demonstra-
tion, and mitigation, they should be compelled to live in the world inhabited
by most of us: a world with great and many pleasures but not entirely free
from irritations and, on occasion, rather painful, abrasive irritations. Remov-
al of one of these irritations by state action which has the effect of prohibit-
ing interracial marriage and thus eliminating an entire class of people is an
unreasonable palliative; its patent unreasonableness as a catharsis makes it
violative of the equal protection clause.
In brief, I believe the equal protection clause will be the primary battle-
ground when the Court rules on the constitutionality of miscegenation stat-
utes. Moreover, I believe the Court will find them to be unconstitutional for
the reasons sketched out above-and without using many more words than
there are in this brief article.
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